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Abstract
I study the eﬀects of risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) on optimal
portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive information that
is diﬃcult to link to fundamentals. I show that the desire of investors to hedge
ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia and excess volatility. Speciﬁcally, when
news is surprising, then investors may not react to price changes although
there are no transaction costs or other market frictions. Moreover, I show that
small shocks to cash ﬂow news, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to
drastic changes in the stock price and hence to excess volatility.
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This paper studies the eﬀects of aversion to risk and ambiguity on optimal portfolios
and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive public information about the value
of an asset. Investors lack data or experience to process this new information and
thus do not know the asset distribution when they condition on this information. I
show that the desire of investors to hedge against ambiguity (i) leads to portfolio
inertia for risky portfolios and (ii) generates excess volatility for asset prices.
Investors face risk and ambiguity when they evaluate an investment in an asset
because they neither know the future realization of the asset’s payoﬀ (risk), nor the
probability of it occurring (ambiguity). This distinction between risk and ambiguity is
often attributed to Knight (1921). In this paper, investor’s preferences are represented
by “max-min” expected utility. In other words, investors evaluate the outcome of an
investment with respect to a set of models and then choose the model that leads
to the lowest expected utility. These preferences exhibit aversion to ambiguity and
are axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Moreover, the axioms describe
behavior that is consistent with experimental evidence (Ellsberg (1961)) and more
recent portfolio choice experiments (Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2010) and Bossaerts,
Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010)).
By focusing on the interaction between risk and ambiguity when investors process
a public signal with unknown precision, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First
this paper provides novel predictions for optimal portfolios that may help explain
why many investors who own stocks do not show much trading activity. For instance,
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) document that almost half of the sample members made no
active changes to their portfolio allocation using data from the Surveys of Consumer
Finances and from TIAA-CREF.
I show that when news is disappointing, then investors can ﬁnd risky stock
allocations that hedge against ambiguous news and thus it is optimal to stick to
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these allocations even if prices change. Hence, investors exhibit portfolio inertia for
risky portfolios without any market frictions such as transaction costs and liquidity
needs (Allen and Gale (1994) and Williamson (1994)), entry cost (Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), Paiella (2007), and Yaron and Zhang (2000)), or inattention (Abel, Eberly,
and Panageas (2007)). Moreover, portfolio inertia occurs more often when investors
use the stock to also hedge the risk of other assets and it is more severe when news
is very surprising.1
Second, this paper produces new insights into the excess volatility puzzle of stock
returns (Shiller (1992)). Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that small shocks to cash ﬂow news may result in drastic changes in the interpretation of this news and hence an econometrician
observing the resulting large stock price movements may conclude excess volatility.2
The ampliﬁcation of these news shocks is more severe for risky stocks. Similarly, I
show that when past evidence about the cash ﬂows of an asset are very disappointing,
then small shocks to the beta of the asset with the market portfolio and/or the market
risk premium may result in drastic changes in the stock price. Hence, the interaction of risk and ambiguity may help explain that stock price volatility spikes around
earnings announcements (Dubinsky and Johannes (2005)) or shortly after very bad
news such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the assassination of JFK, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, or major defaults such as LTCM, Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers
(Bloom (2009)).
This paper is most closely related to Epstein and Schneider (2008), who investigate the impact of ambiguous information on stock prices assuming a representative
investor who is risk neutral and averse to ambiguous information. I build on their
work along two dimensions: (i) investors are risk averse3 and (ii) investors receive
stochastic labor income. I show that the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads to
portfolio inertia for risky portfolios when investors process ambiguous news. Moreover, I show that risk aversion has qualitatively very diﬀerent implications for stock
3

prices. Speciﬁcally, the stock price has a discontinuity which it does not have when
investors are risk neutral and thus the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on stock prices
can be distinguished from the eﬀects of risk alone.4
It is well known that ambiguity aversion leads to portfolio inertia for the riskfree portfolio and thus helps explain non-market participation (Dow and Werlang
(1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Epstein and Schneider (2007)). Epstein
and Schneider (2010) show that portfolio inertia can also arise for risky portfolios
when investors use an ambiguous asset to hedge a risky bond position. Epstein and
Wang (1994) emphasize that portfolio inertia can arise for long stock positions and
thus there may exist a continuum of equilibrium stock prices. I show in this paper
that the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia for risky portfolios
when investors process ambiguous news which leads to an interval of equilibrium stock
prices for some fundamentals.
This paper is also related to recent papers by Easley and O’Hara: Easley and
O’Hara (2010) show that ambiguity aversion can explain sudden market freezes. In
this paper investors are averse to ambiguity in the sense of Bewley (2002) and thus
portfolio inertia arises as part of the preference speciﬁcation. Easley and O’Hara
(2009) study the implications of regulation and ambiguity on equilibrium asset prices
when some investors are ambiguous about the mean and variance of an asset in
the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and some are standard expected utility
maximizers. They ﬁnd that portfolio inertia arises only at the risk-free portfolio and
thus ambiguity aversion only indirectly aﬀects equilibrium asset prices. I show in this
paper that ambiguity averse investors participate in the stock market but nevertheless
exhibit portfolio inertia and thus their behavior directly aﬀects equilibrium asset
prices.
Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) introduce “smooth” preferences to de-
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scribe ambiguity averse behavior. For instance, Caskey (2009) studies how the aggregation of information aﬀects equity prices when some investors are standard expected
utility maximizers and some have smooth ambiguity aversion preferences. I focus on
kinked preferences instead of smooth preferences because Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv
(2010) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) ﬁnd that individuals behavior is more easily described with kinked than with smooth preferences. They
also document that there is substantial heterogeneity in risk and ambiguity aversion
and a non-negligible fraction of individuals behavior is consistent with standard expected utility. Hence, I also study the eﬀects of heterogeneity among investors on
equilibrium stock prices and show that the excess volatility result is robust to aggregation.
This paper is also related to the literature on learning about fundamentals to
explain the excess volatility puzzle. Brennan and Xia (2001) and Veronesi (2000)
consider an economy in which investors learn about the unobservable expected dividend growth rate. In these papers investors have standard expected utility preferences
and thus consider a single posterior distribution to determine expected utility. I also
study the eﬀects of learning about signal quality on optimal portfolios and equilibrium
asset prices when investors are standard expected utility maximizers. I show that asset demand is a strictly decreasing and smooth function of the stock price and thus
there is no portfolio inertia. Moreover, the equilibrium stock price is a continuous
and smooth function of the signal and thus there is no excess volatility.
Routledge and Zin (2009) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) study the
connection of ambiguity with liquidity. Routledge and Zin (2009) consider a ﬁnancial
intermediary who makes a market in a derivative security and show that ambiguity
can drastically increase the bid-ask spread and hence reduce liquidity. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2008) study the eﬀects of ambiguity about the impact of aggregate
liquidity shocks on investors and show that this ambiguity can lead to a socially
5

ineﬃcient ﬂight to quality. In this paper, the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads
to portfolio inertia and excess volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I introduce the model. In Section
II, I solve for optimal asset demand and discuss the portfolio inertia results. In Section
III, I solve for equilibrium stock prices. In Section IV, I discuss the robustness of the
results to aggregation. In Section V, I study the eﬀects of Bayesian learning on
optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices and I conclude in Section VI.

I

Model

Suppose there are two dates 0 and 1. Investors can invest in a risk-free asset and a
risky asset. Let p denote the price of the risky asset, d˜ the future value or dividend of
the risky asset, θ the number of shares invested in the risky asset, and L̃ the random
endowment that investors receive at date 1. There is no consumption at date zero.
The risk-free asset is used as numeraire, so the risk-free rate is zero. Hence, future
wealth w̃ is given by

(

)
˜
w̃ = w0 + d − p θ + L̃,

(1)

in which w0 denotes initial wealth.
˜ The signal
Investors receive a signal s̃ about the future value of the asset d.
s̃ is conditionally independent of labor income L̃. A model consists of a marginal
˜ Investors neither
distribution of d˜ and L̃ and a conditional distribution of s̃ given d.
know the marginal distribution nor the conditional distribution.
I focus in this paper on ambiguity averse investors in the sense of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Speciﬁcally, let u(·) denote the Bernoulli utility function of the
investor, m a model, M(s) the set of all models considered by the investor, and Em [·]
the expectation with respect to the belief generated by the model m. An ambiguity
6

averse investor in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) chooses a portfolio θ to
maximize
inf
m∈M(s)

Em [u (w̃) | s̃ = s]

(2)

subject to the budget constraint given in equation (1).
The curvature of the utility function u(·) determines an investor’s risk aversion
whereas the size of M(s) determines an investors aversion to ambiguity. Investors who
are averse to ambiguity behave as if they have a set of models (a set of marginals and
a set of conditionals) in mind when evaluating the outcome of a decision. The worst
case scenario (the belief generated by m that leads to the lowest expected utility)
that they consider may depend on the portfolio position θ and/or the realization of
the signal s.
Suppose that both the marginal distribution of d˜ and L̃ and the conditional distribution of s̃ given d˜ is normal. There is no ambiguity about the marginal distribution
of d˜ and L̃ and thus there is a single normal marginal:5






 



¯
˜
ρσd σL 
 d  
 d 
 .
  ∼ N   , 
L̄
ρσd σL
σL2
L̃
σd2

(3)

Investors are ambiguous about the conditional distribution of s̃ given d˜ and thus there
is a family of conditionals:

s̃ = d˜ + ε̃,

(
)
ε̃ ∼ N 0, σ 2 ,

(4)

in which σ 2 ∈ [σa2 , σb2 ] ⊂ [0, ∞]. Investors are ambiguous about the precision of the
signal and thus consider a set of precisions when processing this signal. The signal is
[
]
conditionally independent of labor income and thus Cov ε̃, L̃ = 0.
I follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and assume that investors update their
7

beliefs model by model using Bayes rule. Hence, observing the signal does not lead
to a reduction in ambiguity and M(s) = M.6 Speciﬁcally, each model m ∈ M
determines a conditional belief for d˜ and L̃ given s̃ and hence standard normal-normal
updating for each σ 2 ∈ [σa2 , σb2 ] leads to

 


(
)
2 (1 − ϕ)
¯ + ϕ s − d¯
˜
σ
ρσ
σ
(1
−
ϕ)
d
d
d L
d

 



 , (5)
 | s̃ = s ∼ Nϕ 

(
)
(
) ,
ρσd σL (1 − ϕ) σL2 1 − ϕρ2
L̄ + zϕ s − d¯
L̃


in which z = ρ σσLd and ϕ = σd2 /(σd2 + σ 2 ). If labor income is correlated with the
asset (z ̸= 0), then investors use the signal to learn about future labor income which
generates ambiguity about the distribution of future labor income.
It is convenient to describe the informativeness of the signal by ϕ and hence the
set of posterior beliefs is given by [ϕa , ϕb ] ⊂ [0, 1] with
ϕa = σd2 /(σd2 + σb2 )

(6)

ϕb = σd2 /(σd2 + σa2 ).

(7)

The utility of an investor who is averse to ambiguous information holds θ shares of
the risky asset and receives the random endowment L̃ is therefore7
[ (
(
)
)
]
min Eϕ u w0 + d˜ − p θ + L̃ | s̃ = s .

(8)

ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

Investors are more averse to ambiguous information if the interval [ϕa , ϕb ] is large
and therefore the degree of aversion to ambiguous information can be measured by
ϕb − ϕa .
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II

Optimal Demand

In this section I determine the optimal portfolio of an investor who can invest in
a risky asset and a risk-free asset and who receives stochastic labor income and an
ambiguous signal about the future value of the risky asset. I show that there is
a range of prices for which investors do not change their stock position and hence
exhibit portfolio inertia.
Suppose investors have CARA utility over future wealth w̃ (i.e. u(w̃) = −e−γ w̃
with γ > 0) and let CE(θ) denote the certainty equivalent of an ambiguity averse
investor. Then the investor’s utility given in equation (8) is equal to u (CE(θ)) with8
)
(
1
CE(θ) = min
Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] − γVarϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] .
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]
2

(9)

The assumption of CARA-utility and normal beliefs leads to mean-variance preferences over future wealth (ﬁnancial wealth plus labor income) in which the informativeness of the signal measured by ϕ aﬀects both the mean and the variance. The
worst case scenarios for the mean and the variance can not be chosen independently
of each other and hence the belief of an ambiguity averse investor will depend on the
realization of the signal s, the portfolio position θ, and the beta of labor income with
the asset z as the next proposition shows.9
Proposition 1 (Preferences). Let θ̂ ≡ 2(d¯ − s)/(γσd2 ). Then,

( )

1

γVar
[
w̃
|
s̃
=
s]
if
θ
+
z
≤
min
θ̂, 0
E
[
w̃
|
s̃
=
s]
−
ϕa
ϕa

2


( )
( )
CE(θ) =
Eϕb [w̃ | s̃ = s] − 21 γVarϕb [w̃ | s̃ = s] if min θ̂, 0 < θ + z < max θ̂, 0


( )


 Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] − 1 γVarϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] if θ + z ≥ max θ̂, 0 .
a
a
2
(10)
The certainty equivalent CE(θ) is a continuous and concave function of the stock
demand θ. Moreover, it is continuously diﬀerentiable except for the portfolios θ = −z
9

¯
and θ = θ̂ − z if s ̸= d.
To gain some more intuition consider an investor who is contemplating a long
position in the asset (θ > 0). The worst case scenario for the posterior asset mean is
a reliable signal (high ϕ) if bad news arrives and an unreliable signal (low ϕ) if good
news arrives because the mean is signiﬁcantly adjusted downwards with bad news
and moderately adjusted upwards with good news.
Similarly, the worst case scenario for the posterior asset mean when an investor
is contemplating a short position in the asset (θ < 0) is an unreliable signal when
bad news arrives and a reliable signal when good news arrives. On the other hand,
the worst case scenario for the residual asset variance is always an unreliable signal
because in this case less risk is resolved by the signal.
Suppose there is no correlation between the asset and labor income (z = 0) and
hence there is no ambiguity about future labor income. If the signal conveys bad
news, then a reliable signal decreases the posterior asset mean (since more weight is
put on the signal) but it also reduces the residual variance (since more risk is resolved
by the signal). Investors are more worried about the posterior mean for small risks
and are more worried about the residual variance for big risks. Hence, the signal is
treated as reliable (ϕ = ϕb ) for moderate long positions in the asset (0 < θ < θ̂) and
as unreliable (ϕ = ϕa ) otherwise.
There is a portfolio with an intermediate level of risk (θ = θ̂) for which the counteracting mean and variance eﬀects oﬀset each other and utility becomes independent
of signal precision. This portfolio is more risky if there is a big news surprise because
in this case there is more ambiguity about the mean. It is less risky when investors are
more risk averse because in this case investors are more worried about the ambiguous
variance. The second portfolio for which utility does not depend on signal precision
is the riskless portfolio θ = 0.
10

Suppose labor income is correlated with the asset (z ̸= 0) and thus there is
also ambiguity about future labor income. Then the portfolios for which utility is
independent of the precision of the signal are shifted by the hedging demand for labor
income z and therefore are θ = −z and θ = θ̂ − z.
To summarize, an investor who has CARA utility and is averse to ambiguous
information in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) will evaluate the outcome
of a portfolio with respect to the belief ϕ that leads to the lowest expected utility.
Hence, utility of an ambiguity averse investor has two kinks if the signal doesn’t
conﬁrm the unconditional mean of the dividend and are otherwise smooth.10 The
optimal demand for the risky asset when investors are averse to risk and ambiguous
information is determined below.

A

Savage Benchmark

The demand of a standard expected utility maximizer in the sense of Savage (1954)
with subjective belief ϕ is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Demand—Savage Benchmark). Let ϕa = ϕb = ϕ. Then the
demand function for the risky asset is
[
]
Eϕ d˜ | s̃ = s − p
[
] − z.
θϕ (p) =
˜
γVarϕ d | s̃ = s

(11)

Investors use the signal to learn about the future value of the asset. Suppose there
is no correlation between the endowment and the asset; i.e. z = 0. Then investors
will buy the asset as long as the posterior mean exceeds the asset price and they will
sell otherwise. Moreover, investors will buy/sell larger quantities if the signal is more
precise. If investors receive an endowment that is correlated with the asset (z ̸= 0),
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then they will use the asset to hedge their labor income risk. For instance, investors
will sell some of the asset if their future labor income is positively correlated with the
asset (z > 0) and buy otherwise (z < 0).

B

Ambiguity Averse Investors

Let θa (p) denote the demand of a Savage investor with subjective belief ϕa (a standard
expected utility maximizer who treats the signal as unreliable) and θb (p) the demand
of a Savage investor with subjective belief ϕb (a standard expected utility maximizer
who treats the signal as reliable). The solution to the portfolio choice problem of an
investor who has CARA utility and is averse to ambiguity is provided in the next
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Demand). The optimal demand function θ(p) for an investor
with risk aversion γ and aversion to ambiguous information described by [ϕa , ϕb ] is
¯
continuously decreasing in p if s = d¯ and continuously non-increasing in p if s ̸= d.
Speciﬁcally, let θ̂ = 2(d¯ − s)/(γσd2 ) then



θa (p)



( )




max θ̂, 0 − z



θ(p) =

θb (p)


( )




min
θ̂, 0 − z





 θa (p)

(

)

p ≤ p1 ≡ µϕa (s) − max θ̂, 0 γvϕa
( )
p1 < p ≤ p2 ≡ µϕb (s) − max θ̂, 0 γvϕb
( )
p2 < p ≤ p3 ≡ µϕb (s) − min θ̂, 0 γvϕb
( )
p3 < p ≤ p4 ≡ µϕa (s) − min θ̂, 0 γvϕa

(12)

p > p4 ,

¯ denotes the posterior asset mean and vϕ = σ 2 (1 − ϕ)
in which µϕ (s) = d¯ + ϕ(s − d)
d
denotes the residual asset variance when the signal precision is ϕ.

Suppose the asset is uncorrelated with labor income (z = 0). Optimal demand
¯ is presented in the left graph of Figure 1. If
when the signal conveys bad news (s < d)
12

ambiguity averse investors (solid line) take on large long positions in the asset, then
they are more worried about risk than a low posterior mean and hence they treat
the signal as uninformative. In this case their demand coincides with the demand of
a Savage investor with belief ϕa (dashed line). However, if they take on a moderate
long position when the signal conveys bad news, then they are more worried about
a low posterior mean than risk and hence they treat the signal as informative. In
this case their demand coincides with the demand of a Savage investor with belief ϕb
(chain-dotted line).11 There are two portfolios θ = 0 and θ = θ̂ for which the demand
of an ambiguity averse investor is insensitive to changes in the asset price and thus
it is distinctly diﬀerent from the demand of a Savage investor.
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***

C

Portfolio Inertia

It is well known in the literature that with max-min preferences portfolio inertia arises
at certainty (Dow and Werlang (1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Epstein
and Schneider (2007)). For instance, if investors think about taking on a small long
(short) position in the asset, then they fear reliable signals that convey bad (good)
news and unreliable signals that convey good (bad) news because this means a low
posterior mean for their stock position and hence there is a range of prices for which
they rather not be invested in the stock to avoid ambiguity.
Ambiguous information leads to inertia away from certainty because a reliable
signal that conveys bad news decreases the posterior mean but also reduces the residual variance. The counteracting eﬀect of mean and variance on utility exactly oﬀset
each other and utility becomes independent of signal precision if investors long the
portfolio θ = θ̂. This portfolio hedges against ambiguity and small price changes
cannot entice investors away from it because taking on slightly more or less risk than
13

that of the hedging portfolios leads to a large change in the worst case scenario belief
about the informativeness of the signal.12
The right graph of Figure 1 shows optimal demand when the signal conveys bad
¯ and asset and labor income are positively correlated (z > 0). In this case
news (s < d)
the hedging demand for labor income risk is negative and demand shifts downwards.
Neither the posterior mean nor the residual variance of future wealth (ﬁnancial wealth
and labor income) depend on the signal precision for the portfolios θ = −z and
θ = θ̂ − z and thus investors exhibit portfolio inertia for two risky portfolios. The
portfolios that hedge against ambiguity are less invested in the stock because investors
need to sell some of the stock to reduce the additional ambiguity about future wealth
due to the positive correlation between the asset and labor income.
The size of the inaction region depends on the degree of ambiguity and on the
news surprise as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3 (Portfolio Inertia). The size of the price region at which investors
exhibit portfolio inertia is
¯
(ϕb − ϕa ) |s − d|.

(13)

There is more ambiguity about the posterior mean when news is very surprising
and thus larger price changes are necessary to convince an ambiguity averse investor
to give up either of the two hedging portfolios θ = −z and θ = θ̂ − z. On the other
hand, if the signal conﬁrms the unconditional mean of the dividend, then there is no
ambiguity about the conditional mean and hence there is no portfolio inertia because
the ambiguity averse investor treats the signal as unreliable for all portfolios and
hedging demands for labor income.
The left graph of Figure 1 shows optimal demand when the signal conveys bad
news and the right graph shows optimal demand when the signal conveys good news.
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A very large news surprise leads to a large inaction region (dashed line). Moreover,
the portfolio position at which investors exhibit inertia is riskier when news is very
surprising because the resulting increase in ambiguity about the residual variance is
oﬀset by the increase in ambiguity about the posterior mean when news is worse than
expected.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***
I conclude this section with a summary of the predictions for optimal portfolios.
Corollary 1. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity, then
(i) there is a range of prices for which investors are neither long/nor short the stock
when news is surprising,
(ii) there is a range of prices for which investors do not adjust their long stock
position when news is worse than expected,
(iii) there is a range of prices for which investors do not adjust their short stock
position when news is better than expected,
(iv) the need of investors to hedge labor income risk leads to portfolio inertia for
risky portfolios when news is surprising, and
(v) portfolio inertia is more severe for extreme news surprises.

III

Equilibrium

In this section I solve for equilibrium prices when a representative investor receives
ambiguous information about an asset. I show that small shocks to news about cash
ﬂows, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in asset prices.
The proof of the existence of a representative investor is deferred to Section IV.
15

Suppose there is a representative investor with CARA-utility who is averse to
ambiguity. In equilibrium, the representative investor holds the stock and consumes
the liquidating dividend d˜ and the labor income L̃. Hence, the stock price at date
one equals the liquidating dividend and θ = 1. The stock price at date zero which is
denoted by p(s) is determined below.

A

Savage Benchmark

Suppose the representative investor is a standard expected utility maximizer with
subjective belief ϕ and let pϕ (s) denote the stock price in this case. The equilibrium
stock price is provided in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Price—Savage Benchmark). Let ϕa = ϕb = ϕ. Then
[
]
[
]
pϕ (s) = Eϕ d˜ | s̃ = s − γ(1 + z)Varϕ d˜ | s̃ = s .

(14)

The stock price is lower when labor income is positively correlated with the aggregate dividend because in this case the representative investor would like to sell the
stock to hedge labor income risk and thus the price has to decrease to keep him from
doing that. Similarly, better news increases the posterior mean of the stock and thus
the price has to increase to clear the market.
The stock price satisﬁes the Capital Asset Pricing Model:
[
pϕ (s) = Eϕ

]
[
]
˜
˜
d | s̃ = s − γ Covϕ w̃, d | s̃ = s

(15)

¯ − (1 − ϕ)βλ,
= d¯ + ϕ(s − d)
in which β denotes the unconditional beta of the stock with the market portfolio and
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λ denotes the unconditional risk premium of the market portfolio.13 Speciﬁcally,
[
]
˜
Cov w̃, d

(1 + z)σd2
Var [w̃]
σd2 + 2ρσd σL + σL2
(
)
λ = γVar [w̃] = γ σd2 + 2ρσd σL + σL2 .

β=

=

(16)
(17)

The stock price pϕ (s) is a strictly increasing continuous function of the signal s and a
strictly decreasing and continuous function of the unconditional stock risk premium
βλ. This is no longer true when investors are averse to ambiguity as the remainder
of this section shows.

B

Aversion to Ambiguity

Let pa (s) and pb (s) denote the equilibrium stock price when the representative investor is a standard expected utility maximizers with subjective belief ϕa and ϕb ,
respectively. The equilibrium stock price when the representative investor is averse
to ambiguity is given in the next theorem.14
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Stock Price). Let ŝ = d¯ − 12 βλ. There is a unique equilibrium stock price correspondence:



{pa (s)}





 Pŝ
p(s) ∈


{pb (s)}





 P (s)
0

if s > ŝ and β > 0 or s < ŝ and β < 0
if s = ŝ and β > 0 or

β<0

(18)

if s < ŝ and β > 0 or s > ŝ and β < 0
if

β = 0.

¯ − (1 − ϕ)βλ and
Speciﬁcally, p ∈ Pŝ , if ∃ ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] such that p = d¯ + ϕ(ŝ − d)
¯
p ∈ P0 (s), if ∃ ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] such that p = d¯ + ϕ(s − d).
The left graph of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when there
17

is no ambiguity about future labor income (z = 0 and thus βλ = γσd2 ). The representative investor is more worried about a low posterior mean when the signal is lower
than ŝ and more worried about risk when the signal exceeds ŝ because the posterior
mean goes down when the signal decreases, whereas the residual variance does not
depend on the signal. Hence, there is a strong price reaction to very bad news because the representative investor treats all signals below ŝ as reliable.15 Moreover, the
price suddenly drops when the signal increase through the critical value ŝ, because
switching from a reliable to an unreliable signal leads to a sudden increase in the risk
premium and thus to a sudden drop in the stock price.

*** INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***

What is the equilibrium price at s = ŝ? Let p+ (ŝ) ≡ lim p(s) denote the limit of
s↓ŝ

−

p(s) when s approaches ŝ from the right and p (ŝ) ≡ lim p(s) denote the limit of p(s)
s↑ŝ

when s approaches ŝ from the left. Then every price that is contained in the interval
[p+ (ŝ), p− (ŝ)] is an equilibrium. Intuitively, if s = ŝ, then utility of the representative
investor does not depend on the precision of the signal at the market clearing stock
demand θ = 1 and thus there is no ambiguity. The representative investor is averse
to ambiguity and thus there is an interval of equilibrium prices for which she does
not give up the portfolio θ = 1 that hedges against ambiguity.

C

Shocks to Cash Flow News

The sudden change in the representative investor’s worst case scenario belief ampliﬁes
the eﬀects of news shocks on stock prices and hence leads to excess volatility. Specifically, supply (dotted line in the right graph of Figure 3) is price inelastic and equal
to demand for an interval of prices at the critical signal value ŝ (solid line). A slightly
lower signal value shifts the inaction region of the demand upwards (chain dotted
18

line) and thus pushes the (now unique) equilibrium price close to p− (ŝ) whereas a
slightly higher signal value shifts the inaction region downwards (dashed line) and
pushes the new equilibrium price close to p+ (ŝ).16 Hence, small changes to the signal
can result in large changes in the asset price.
To quantify the ampliﬁcation mechanism of small news shocks I compute the
variance of the asset price conditional on the signal being in an ϵ−intervall around
the critical signal value ŝ. The results are plotted in the left graph of Figure 4 when
the “true” conditional distribution is characterized by ϕ = (ϕa +ϕb )/2.17 The variance
is small when investors are neutral to risk or ambiguity but not when they are averse
to both. Intuitively, there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium signal-to-price map
if investors are standard expected utility maximizers (ϕa = ϕb = ϕ) or if they are risk
neutral (γ = 0). The right graph of Figure 4 shows the corresponding equilibrium
signal-to-price map for a Savage investor with belief ϕ = (ϕa + ϕb )/2, a risk neutral
ambiguity averse investor, and two investors who are averse to risk and ambiguity.18
*** INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ***
The ampliﬁcation of news shocks occurs when the signal is close to the critical
signal value ŝ = d¯ − 12 βλ in which case utility of the representative investor is independent of signal precision and thus she is perfectly hedged against ambiguity. This
is formalized in the next proposition by computing the size of the price discontinuity.
Proposition 5 (Shocks to Cash Flow News). Let ŝ = d¯ − 12 βλ. Then
1
∆p(ŝ) = lim p(s) − lim p(s) = − (ϕb − ϕa ) (max (β, 0) − min (β, 0)) λ.
s↓ŝ
s↑ŝ
2

(19)

The critical signal value ŝ is decreasing in the unconditional risk premium of the
asset (βλ) because in this case investors are more worried about risk and thus the
news has to be more surprising to avoid a decrease in the risk of the portfolio that
19

hedges against ambiguity. Hence, price crashes for risky stocks only occur for big
news surprises. But for big news surprises the diﬀerence between the conditional risk
premium of reliable and unreliable signals is large and thus prices crash more for risky
stocks. This is illustrated in the graphs of 5 that show the equilibrium signal-to-price
map for positive, zero, and negative beta stocks.

*** INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ***

The predictions for the eﬀects of shocks to cash ﬂow news on stock prices are
summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 2. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity then

(i) small shocks to cash ﬂow news may lead to drastic changes in the price of positive
beta stocks if the news is disappointing,
(ii) small shocks to cash ﬂow news may lead to drastic changes in the price of negative beta stocks if the news is good,
(iii) and the ampliﬁcation of news shocks is stronger for riskier stocks.

D

Shocks to Asset Betas and Market Risk Premia

So far we have only looked at how changes in cash ﬂow news aﬀect equilibrium stock
prices. I will now take the news about cash ﬂows as given and study how changes to
asset betas and/or market risk premia (and thus shocks to the stock risk premium)
will eﬀect stock prices.
Suppose investors receive ambiguous news about the future dividend of the stock.
The equilibrium price determined in Theorem 2 can be also seen as a mapping from
the unconditional stock risk premium βλ to the equilibrium price p(βλ).19 The left
20

graph of Figure 6 shows the equilibrium price mapping for bad news and the right
graph shows it for good news.
(
)
c ≡ 2 d¯ − s
There is an interval of equilibrium stock prices if βλ = 0 or βλ = βλ
because in this case the representative investor’s utility does not depend on the precision of the signal and thus there is no ambiguity about the market portfolio. A
change in the beta of the stock changes the hedging demand for labor income risk (z)
and thus aﬀects the mean and the variance of the market portfolio. Suppose news is
worse than expected (left graph). Then the representative investors treats the signal
c and as unreliable otherwise.
as reliable for moderate stock risk premia (0 < βλ < βλ)
If the risk premium increases through either of the two critical values than the representative investor dramatically changes the worst case scenario belief and thus an
econometrician who observes the resulting drastic price change may conclude excess
volatility.

*** INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ***

The ampliﬁcation mechanism for shocks to stock risk premia is quantiﬁed in the
next proposition.
(
)
c = 2 d¯ − s .
Proposition 6 (Shocks to Stock Risk Premia). Fix s ∈ R and deﬁne βλ
Then
(

)
c
∆p βλ = lim p(βλ) − lim p(βλ)
c
βλ↓βλ

c
βλ↑βλ

(

(

)
(
))
= − (ϕb − ϕa ) max d¯ − s, 0 − min d¯ − s, 0

(20)

and
∆p (0) = lim p(βλ) − lim p(βλ)
βλ↓0

βλ↑0

))
)
(
(
= − (ϕb − ϕa ) max d¯ − s, 0 − min d¯ − s, 0 .
(

21

(21)

If news is very surprising than there is more ambiguity about the posterior mean
and hence there is a bigger diﬀerence between the stock price for reliable and unreliable
signals. I conclude this section with a summary of the predictions for the eﬀects of
shocks to asset betas and/or market risk premia on stock prices.
Corollary 3. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity and cash ﬂow news is
surprising, then

(i) small shocks to asset betas may lead to drastic changes in stock prices,
(ii) small shocks to market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in stock prices,
(iii) and ampliﬁcation of these shocks is more severe when news is more surprising.

IV

Aggregation

So far I have studied properties of equilibrium stock prices when the economy is
populated by a single representative investors. However, Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv
(2010) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) document that
there is a lot of heterogeneity in aversion to risk and ambiguity. Moreover, Chapman
and Polkovnichenko (2009) demonstrate that the size of the market risk premium is
sensitive to ignoring heterogeneity because of the endogenous withdrawal of ambiguity
averse investors from the market for the risky asset. Similarly, Easley and O’Hara
(2009) ﬁnd that ambiguity averse investors only indirectly aﬀect equilibrium asset
prices because when they invest in the stock market then they behave like standard
expected utility maximizer.
This raises the following three questions that will be addressed in this section:20

(i) Does there exist a representative investor with the properties assumed in Section
22

III? Yes, there does exist a representative investor if all investors have the same
ambiguity.
(ii) If there does not exist a representative investor, is there still a discontinuity
in the equilibrium signal-to-price map? If investors diﬀer with respect to their
aversion to ambiguity, then there is still a discontinuity in the equilibrium signalto-price map if the range of signal precisions considered by investors overlap.
(iii) Do ambiguity averse investors directly eﬀect asset prices in equilibrium? In
other words, is there an equilibrium in which ambiguity averse investors invest in the stock and behave distinctly diﬀerent from standard expected utility
maximizers? Yes, ambiguity averse investors directly aﬀect equilibrium asset
prices.
Suppose there is no labor income and consider three investors that diﬀer with respect
to their aversion to risk and ambiguity. The ﬁrst investor has the highest degree of
aversion to risk and ambiguity (γ1 = 5 and [ϕa1 , ϕb1 ] = [1/10, 9/10]). Her demand
(dotted line) does not change for a wide range of prices and is only moderately
decreasing otherwise. The second investor (chain-dotted line) has the lowest degree of
aversion to ambiguity (γ2 = 5/4 and [ϕa2 , ϕb2 ] = [1/4, 3/4]), whereas the third investor
(dashed line) has the lowest degree of risk aversion (γ3 = 1 and [ϕa3 , ϕb3 ] = [1/4, 4/5]).
The left graph of Figure 7 shows the demand function for all three investors and
aggregate demand.
*** INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ***
There is a range of prices for which aggregate demand (solid line) is ﬂat. The
individual demand for the second investor (chain-dotted line) is constant equal to 2/5
for the same range of prices whereas the demand for the third investor (dashed line) is
1/2 and the demand for the ﬁrst investor (dotted line) is 1/10 for an even wider range
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of prices. Hence, aggregate demand sums up to the market clearing stock demand
of one and the range of prices at which the investor with the smallest aversion to
ambiguity does not change her demand comprises the interval of equilibrium prices.
The right graph of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when the
economy consists of the three investors with diﬀerent aversion to risk and ambiguity
described above (solid line). There is a price discontinuity at the critical signal value
2
¯
ŝ = d−γσ
d /2 = 93.75 in which 1/γ is the sum of the risk tolerance of the three investor
∑
(1/γ = 3h=1 1/γh = 2). Moreover, there is a range of prices [p1 , p2 ] = [89.1, 92.2]

for which all three investors don’t change their long stock positions and thus behave
distinctly diﬀerent from standard expected utility maximizers.
Consider the same three investors but assume that they all have the same ambiguity [ϕa , ϕb ] = [1/4, 3/4]. In this case there exists a representative investor with risk
tolerance equal to the sum of the risk tolerances of all three investors.21 The dashed
line in the right graph of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map in this
case. If the economy is populated by the three heterogeneous investors, then the price
reacts more to signals lower than ŝ and less to signals larger than ŝ because there is
more ambiguity than in the economy with the representative investor.
The size of the price discontinuity when there is heterogeneity with respect to
ambiguity is determined by the investor with the lowest degree of ambiguity. This
implies that there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium signal-to-price map if at
least one investor has standard expected utility preferences.22 However, the next
example shows that even with no discontinuity, prices may still abruptly change
because ambiguity averse investors directly aﬀect prices when they change the worst
case scenario belief in equilibrium.
For instance, consider an economy in which one investor is averse to ambiguity
and the other investor is not. The ambiguity averse investor has the range of beliefs
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[ϕa , ϕb ] = [1/4, 3/4] and risk aversion γ = 1. The Savage investor has the same
risk aversion and the subjective belief ϕm = (ϕa + ϕb )/2 = 1/2. The equilibrium
signal-to-price map is shown by the solid line in the right graph of Figure 8. For
comparison, this graph also shows the equilibrium price when the economy consists
of two Savage investors with subjective beliefs ϕm and ϕb (dashed line) and ϕm and
ϕa (chain-dotted), respectively.
The solid line in the left graph shows the equilibrium demand of the ambiguity
averse investor and the dashed line shows the equilibrium demand of the Savage
investor with belief ϕm . There is a range of signal values for which (i) both investors
are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor behaves like a Savage investor, (ii)
both investors are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor does not behave
like a Savage investor, (iii) the ambiguity averse investor does not participate and does
not behave like a Savage investor (this is not apparent from the ﬁgure but occurs for
very bad news and very good news).

*** INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE ***

V

Bayesian Model Uncertainty

I have shown in the previous sections that investors who are averse to risk and ambiguity hedge against uncertain information quality and thus exhibit portfolio inertia.
This behavior leads to an ampliﬁcation mechanism of small shocks to cash ﬂow news
and risk premia for equilibrium asset prices. These results are not obtained when
investors are standard expected utility maximizers with known information quality.
I consider in this section investors who maximize standard expected utility and
have a unique prior over the range of signal precisions [ϕa , ϕb ] and thus also beneﬁt
from hedging uncertainty about information quality. I show that optimal demand
25

of these investors is a strictly decreasing and smooth function of the stock price and
hence there is no portfolio inertia. Moreover, the equilibrium stock price is a smooth
function of the signal and hence there is no excess volatility.23
Consider the model described in Section I without the random endowment. The
precision of the signal is random and denoted by ϕ̃. It can can take on either the
value ϕa or ϕb with equal probability. Investors choose θ to maximize
[ (
(
) )
]
(
)
(
)
˜
E u w0 + d − p θ | s̃ = s = πs u CES (θ, ϕa ) + (1 − πs )u CES (θ, ϕb ) , (22)

in which
( [
]
)
[
]
1
CES (θ, ϕ) = w0 + E d˜ | s̃ = s, ϕ̃ = ϕ − p θ − γ Var d˜ | s̃ = s, ϕ̃ = ϕ θ2
2
and

(

)

πs ≡ Prob ϕ̃ = ϕa | s̃ = s =

√

(
1+

ϕb
e
ϕa

− 12 (ϕb −ϕa )

(

¯
d−s
σd

)2

(23)

)−1
.

(24)

Optimal demand (dotted line) when the signal constitutes a one standard deviation bad news surprise is shown in the left graph of Figure 9 and it is shown for a two
standard deviation bad news surprise in the right graph. For comparison, I also plot
the demand of two standard expected utility maximizers with dogmatic beliefs ϕa
(dashed line) and ϕb (chain-dotted line), and demand of an ambiguity averse investor
(solid line).
Optimal demand is a strictly decreasing function of the stock price and thus
there is no portfolio inertia. If news is worse than expected, then investors think that
it is more likely that the signal is unreliable and thus their demand resembles the
demand of a standard expected utility maximizer with dogmatic belief ϕa . Moreover,
investors are worried about risk and thus hedge against uncertain information quality
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by putting less weight on the signal. However, for moderate long positions in the
asset investors deviate from the demand of a standard expected utility maximizer
with dogmatic belief ϕa because investor are more worried about a low posterior
mean than risk when news is bad and thus they hedge by putting more weight on the
signal.

*** INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ***

The equilibrium signal-to-price map when there is a standard expected utility
maximizing representative investor with random signal precision is shown in Figure 10
(dashed line). This ﬁgure also shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when there
are two standard expected utility maximizing representative investors with dogmatic
beliefs ϕa (dashed line) and ϕb (chain-dotted line), and it shows the equilibriumsignal-to-price map when the representative investor is averse to ambiguity (solid
line). The equilibrium signal-to-price map is smooth when investors are standard
expected utility maximizers and thus there is no excess volatility.

*** INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE ***

VI

Conclusion

In this paper I study the eﬀects of risk and ambiguity on optimal portfolios and
equilibrium asset prices when investors receive a signal with unknown precision. I
show that desire of investors to hedge ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia for risky
portfolios. Moreover, I show that small shocks to cash ﬂow news, asset betas or
market risk premia can lead to drastic changes in the worst case scenario belief about
the precision of the signal and thus an econometrician observing the resulting drastic
price change may conclude excess volatility.
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A

Proofs

¯
¯ denote the posterior asset mean and vϕ = σ 2 (1−ϕ) the posterior
Let µϕ = d+ϕ(s−
d)
d
asset variance. The next lemma is used for the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. The posterior mean of future wealth w̃ given in equation (1) is
(
)
Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] = w0 + (µϕ (s) − p) θ + L̄ + z µϕ (s) − d¯
¯ + (µϕ (s) − p) (θ + z).
= w0 + L̄ + (p − d)z
The posterior variance of future wealth w̃ given in equation (1) is
[
]
Varϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] = Varϕ (θ + z) d˜ + ε̃L | s̃ = s
= vϕ (θ + z)2 + σL2 (1 − ρ2 ).

(A.1)

(A.2)

The certainty equivalent of a standard expected utility maximizer with belief ϕ is
1
CES (θ, ϕ) = Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] − γVarϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s]
2
¯ − 1 γ σ 2 (1 − ρ2 )
= w0 + L̄ + (p − d)z
2 L
1
+ (µϕ (s) − p) (θ + z) − γ vϕ (θ + z)2 .
2

(A.3)

Proof. To determine the
mean and variance of future wealth rewrite labor
( posterior
)
˜
¯
income as L̃ = L̄ + z d − d + ε̃L with z = ρσL /σd and ε̃L ∼ N (0, σL2 (1 − ρ2 )) and
use the fact that ε̃L is independent of s̃.
It is well known that the certainty equivalent of a CARA utility investor with normally
distributed wealth is
1
CES (θ, ϕ) = Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] − γVarϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] .
2

(A.4)

Plugging equation (A.1) and (A.2) into equation (A.4) leads to the certainty equivalent in equation (A.3).
Proof of Proposition 1. The utility of an ambiguity averse investor given in equation
(8) is
[ (
(
)
)
]
(
)
˜
min Eϕ u w0 + d − p θ + L̃ | s̃ = s = min u CES (θ, ϕ)
(A.5)
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]
(
)
=u
min CES (θ, ϕ) ,
(A.6)
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

where CES (θ, ϕ) is given in equation (A.3). Hence, the certainty equivalent of an
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ambiguity averse investor is
CE(θ) = min CES (θ, ϕ)
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]
(
)
1
= min
Eϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] − γVarϕ [w̃ | s̃ = s] .
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]
2

(A.7)
(A.8)

To prove Proposition 1 we need to minimize CES (θ, ϕ) given in equation (A.3) w.r.t.
ϕ. Let x = θ + z. CES (x, ϕ) does not depend on ϕ if x = 0 and x = θ̂. Hence,
CE(0) = min CES (0, ϕ) = CES (0, ϕa ) = CES (0, ϕb )
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

(A.9)

¯ − 1 γ σ 2 (1 − ρ2 )
= w0 + L̄ + (p − d)z
2 L
and
CE(θ̂) = min CES (θ̂, ϕ) = CES (θ̂, ϕa ) = CES (θ̂, ϕb )
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

¯
¯ − 1 γ σ 2 (1 − ρ2 ) + 2 d − s (s − p).
= w0 + L̄ + (p − d)z
2 L
γσd2

(A.10)

Taking the ﬁrst derivative of CES (x, ϕ) w.r.t. ϕ leads to
)
∂CES (x, ϕ)
1 2 2 1 2(
¯
= x(s − d) + γσd x = γσd x − θ̂ x.
∂ϕ
2
2

(A.11)

Let’s consider three diﬀerent cases: (i) s = d¯ ⇔ θ̂ = 0, (ii) s < d¯ ⇔ θ̂ > 0, and (iii)
s > d¯ ⇔ θ̂ < 0.
S

(i) Let x ∈ R then ∂CE∂ϕ(x,ϕ) > 0 for all ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] and thus the minimum of
CES (x, ϕ) is attained at ϕ = ϕa . Hence,
CE(x) = min CES (x, ϕ) = CES (x, ϕa )
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

∀ x ∈ R.

(A.12)

CES (x, ϕa ) is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave for all x ∈ R and thus
CE(x) is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave for all x ∈ R.
(ii) Let x < 0 or x > θ̂ then

∂CES (x,ϕ)
∂ϕ

> 0 for all ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] and thus the minimum
S

of CE (x, ϕ) is attained at ϕ = ϕa . Let 0 < x < θ̂ then ∂CE∂ϕ(x,ϕ) < 0 for all
ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] and thus the minimum of CES (x, ϕ) is attained at ϕ = ϕb . Let
x = 0 or x = θ̂ then CE(0) and CE(θ̂) are given in equation (A.9) and (A.10),
S
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respectively. In this case

∂CES (x,ϕ)
∂ϕ

= 0 for all ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ]. Hence,


S
 CE (x, ϕa ) if x ≤ 0
CE(x) =
CES (x, ϕb ) if 0 < x < θ̂

CES (x, ϕa ) if x ≥ θ̂.

(A.13)

CE(x) is continuous for all x ∈ R because CES (x, ϕ) is continuous for all x and
ϕ, and CES (θ̂, ϕa ) = CES (θ̂, ϕb ) and CES (0, ϕa ) = CES (0, ϕb ).
CES (x, ϕ) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all x ∈ R and ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] and the
second derivative of CES (x, ϕ) w.r.t. x is negative for all x ∈ R and ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ].
Hence, there is an open neighborhood for all x ∈ R\{0, θ̂} such that CE(x)
is continuously diﬀerentiable and the second derivative of CES (x) w.r.t. x is
negative.
To verify non-diﬀerentiability at x = 0 and x = θ̂ and concavity of CE(x) let’s
determine the left and right derivative of CE(x) at x = θ̂ and x = 0:
∂CE(x)
∂x
x↓θ̂
∂CE(x)
CE′− (θ̂) ≡ lim
∂x
x↑θ̂
∂CE(x)
CE′+ (0) = lim
x↓0
∂x
∂CE(x)
CE′− (0) = lim
x↑0
∂x
CE′+ (θ̂) ≡ lim

¯ − ϕa (s − d)
¯
= d¯ − p + 2(s − d)

(A.14)

¯ − ϕb (s − d)
¯
= d¯ − p + 2(s − d)

(A.15)

¯ −p
= d¯ + ϕb (s − d)

(A.16)

¯ − p.
== d¯ + ϕa (s − d)

(A.17)

We have that CE′− (θ̂) > CE′+ (θ̂) and CE′− (0) > CE′+ (0). Hence, CE(x) is
concave for all x ∈ R and diﬀerentiable for all x ∈ R\{0, θ̂}.
(iii) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in the previous case
that

S
 CE (x, ϕa ) if x ≤ θ̂
CE(x) =
(A.18)
CES (x, ϕb ) if θ̂ < x < 0

S
CE (x, ϕa ) if x ≥ 0
and that CE(x) is continuous and concave. Moreover, CE(x) is diﬀerentiable
for all x ∈ R\{0, θ̂}.

Proof of Proposition 2. To solve for the optimal demand θϕ (p) of a Savage investor
with belief ϕ we need to maximize his certainty equivalent which is given in equation
(A.3) with respect to θ.
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Let x = θ + z and take the ﬁrst derivative of CES (x) w.r.t. x and set it equal to zero:
µϕ (s) − p − γvϕ x = 0.

(A.19)

Solving for x leads to x = (µϕ (s) − p)/(γvϕ ). The certainty equivalent is concave and
thus θϕ = (µϕ (s) − p)/(γvϕ ) − z is the unique maximum of CES (θ).
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider three cases: (i) s − d¯ = 0 ⇔ θ̂ = 0, (ii) s − d¯ < 0 ⇔
θ̂ > 0, and (iii) s − d¯ > 0 ⇔ θ̂ < 0.
¯ then it follows from Proposition 1 that CE(θ) = CES (θ, ϕa ) for all
(i) If s = d,
θ ∈ R and thus it follows from Proposition 2 that θ(p) = (µa (s) − p)/(γva ) − z.
Moreover, θ(p) is strictly decreasing in p.
¯ then CE(θ) has two kinks. Let’s maximize CE(θ) w.r.t. x = θ + z.
(ii) If s < d,
Consider the ﬁve subcases (a) p < p1 = µa (s) − θ̂γva , (b) p1 ≤ p ≤ p2 =
µb (s) − θ̂γvb , (c) p2 < p < p3 = µb (s), (d) p3 ≤ p ≤ p4 = µa (s), and (e) p > p4 .
(s)−p
(ii)(a) We need to show that x = xa ≡ µaγv
maximizes CE(x) for all p < p1.
a
We have that
µa (s) − p
µa (s) − p1
xa =
>
= θ̂.
(A.20)
γva
γva

Hence, there exists an ϵ > 0 s.t. CE(ξ) = CES (ξ, ϕa ) for all ξ ∈ (xa −
ϵ, xa + ϵ). From Proposition 2 follows that xa is a global maximum of
CES (ξ, ϕa ) and thus xa maximizes CE(ξ) for all ξ ∈ (xa − ϵ, xa + ϵ). CE(ξ)
is concave and thus xa is a global maximum of CE(ξ) for all p < p1.
(ii)(b) We need to show that x = θ̂ maximizes CE(x) for all p1 ≤ p ≤ p2 . The
certainty equivalent is concave (see Proposition 1) and hence it is suﬃcient
to show that θ̂ is a local maximum. θ̂ is a local maximum if there is an
ϵ > 0 such that
CE(θ̂) ≥ CE (x) = min CES (x, ϕ)
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

∀x ∈ (θ̂ − ϵ, θ̂ + ϵ).

For ϵ suﬃciently small we have that
{
CES (x, ϕa ) if θ̂ ≤ x < θ̂ + ϵ
CE(x) =
CES (x, ϕb ) if θ̂ − ϵ < x ≤ θ̂.

(A.21)

(A.22)

Hence, we have to show that
CE(θ̂) ≥ CES (x, ϕa )

∀x ∈ (θ̂, θ̂ + ϵ)

(A.23)

CE(θ̂) ≥ CES (x, ϕb )

∀x ∈ (θ̂ − ϵ, θ̂).

(A.24)
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Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.23) we have for
all x ∈ [θ̂, θ̂ + ϵ) that24
(
)
1
CE (x, ϕa ) − CE(θ̂) = (x − θ̂) µa (s) − p − θ̂γ va − γ va (x − θ̂) ≤ 0
2
(A.25)
S

Inequality (A.25) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ [θ̂, θ̂ + ϵ) if
µa (s) − θ̂γ va ≤ p.

(A.26)

Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.24) we have for
all x ∈ (θ̂ − ϵ, θ̂] that25
(
)
1
CES (x, ϕb ) − CE(θ̂) = (x − θ̂) µb (s) − p − θ̂γ vb − γ vb (x − θ̂) ≤ 0.
2
(A.27)

Inequality (A.27) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ (θ̂ − ϵ, θ̂] if
p ≤ µb (s) − θ̂γ vb .

(A.28)

Combining equations (A.26) and (A.28) leads to the desired result.
(ii)(c) We need to show that x = xb ≡
p3 . We have that
θ̂ =

µb (s)−p
γvb

maximizes CE(x) for all p2 < p <

µb (s) − p2
µb (s) − p
µb (s) − p3
> xb =
>
= 0.
γvb
γvb
γvb

(A.29)

Hence, there exists an ϵ > 0 s.t. CE(x) = CES (x, ϕb ) for all x ∈ (xb −ϵ, xb +
ϵ). From Proposition 2 follows that xb is a global maximum of CES (x, ϕb )
and thus xb maximizes CE(x) for all x ∈ (xb − ϵ, xb + ϵ). CE(x) is concave
and thus xb is a global maximum of CE(x) for all p2 < p < p3 .
(ii)(d) We need to show that x = 0 maximizes CE(x) for all p3 ≤ p ≤ p4 . The
certainty equivalent is concave (see Proposition 1) and hence it is suﬃcient
to show that x = 0 is a local maximum. x = 0 is a local maximum if there
is an ϵ > 0 such that
CE(0) ≥ CE (x) = min CES (x, ϕ)
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

∀x ∈ (−ϵ, ϵ).

For ϵ suﬃciently small we have that
{
CES (x, ϕb ) if 0 ≤ x < ϵ
CE(x) =
CES (x, ϕa ) if −ϵ < x ≤ 0.
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(A.30)

(A.31)

Hence, we have to show that
CE(0) ≥ CES (x, ϕb )

∀x ∈ [0, ϵ)

(A.32)

CE(0) ≥ CE (x, ϕa )

∀x ∈ (−ϵ, 0].

(A.33)

S

Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.32) we have for
all x ∈ [0, ϵ) that26
(
)
1
S
CE (x, ϕb ) − CE(0) = x µb (s) − p − γ vb x ≤ 0.
(A.34)
2
Inequality (A.34) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ [0, ϵ) if
µb (s) ≤ p.

(A.35)

Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.33) we have for
all x ∈ (−ϵ, 0] that27
(
)
1
S
CE (x, ϕa ) − CE(0) = x µa (s) − p − γ vb x ≤ 0
(A.36)
2
Inequality (A.36) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ (−ϵ, 0] if
p ≤ µa (s).

(A.37)

Combining equations (A.35) and (A.37) leads to the desired result.
(s)−p
(ii)(e) We need to show that x = xa ≡ µaγv
maximizes CE(x) for all p > p4.
a
We have that
µa (s) − p
µa (s) − p4
xa =
<
= 0.
(A.38)
γva
γva

Hence, there exists an ϵ > 0 s.t. CE(x) = CES (x, ϕa ) for all x ∈ (xa −ϵ, xa +
ϵ). From Proposition 2 follows that xa is a global maximum of CES (x, ϕa )
and thus xa maximizes CE(x) for all x ∈ (xa − ϵ, xa + ϵ). CE(x) is concave
and thus xa is a global maximum of CE(x) for all p > p4.
Demand x(p) = θ(p) + z and it is strictly decreasing in p for the price ranges
considered in (a), (c), and (e) and it is constant for the price ranges considered
in (b) and (d) and hence θ(p) is a non increasing function of p.
¯ then CE(θ) has two kinks. It is straightforward to show using the
(iii) If s > d,
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same arguments as in the previous case that

µa (s) − p


−z
p ≤ p1 = µa (s)



γva

 −z

p1 < p ≤ p2 = µb (s)


 µ (s) − p
b
θ(p) =
−z
p2 < p ≤ p3 = µb (s) − θ̂γvb

γvb




θ̂ − z
p3 < p ≤ p4 ≡ µa (s) − θ̂γva




µ (s) − p

 a
−z
p > p4 .
γva

(A.39)

maximizes CE(θ) for all θ ∈ R and that θ(p) is non-increasing in the stock price
p.

Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from Theorem 1 that the size of the price region at
which investors exhibit portfolio inertia is p2 − p1 and p4 − p3 . Speciﬁcally,
( )
p2 − p1 = µb (s) − µa (s) − γ(vb − va ) max θ̂, 0
)
( ¯
d
−
s
2
(A.40)
¯ + γσ (ϕb − ϕa ) max 2
,0
= (ϕb − ϕa )(s − d)
d
γσd2
¯
= (ϕb − ϕa )|s − d|
and

( )
p4 − p3 = µa (s) − µb (s) − γ(va − vb ) min θ̂, 0
¯ −
= −(ϕb − ϕa )(s − d)

γσd2 (ϕb

)
( ¯
d−s
,0
− ϕa ) min 2
γσd2

(A.41)

¯
= (ϕb − ϕa )|s − d|.

Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2 follows that the demand of a Savage investor with belief ϕ is θ = (µϕ (s) − p)/(γvϕ ) − z. The asset is in unit supply in
equilibrium and thus 1 = (µϕ (s) − p)/(γvϕ ) − z. Solving for p leads to equation (14).

Proof of Theorem 2. Take the optimal demand function given in equation (12) of
Theorem 1 and set it equal to the market clearing stock demand of one.
2
2
2
2
¯
Recall that θ̂ = 2(d−s)/(γσ
d ), Var[w̃] = σd +2ρσd σL +σL > 0, β = ((1 + z)σd ) /Var[w̃],
2
and βλ = γσd (1 + z). Consider the three cases (i) z > −1 ⇔ β > 0, (i) z < −1 ⇔
β < 0, and (i) z = −1 ⇔ β = 0.
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(i) Consider the three subcases (a) s = ŝ, (b) s < ŝ, and (c) ŝ > s with ŝ =
¯
d¯ − 12 γσd2 (1 + z) < d.
(i)(a) Let
pa = µa (ŝ) − (1 + z)γva
pb = µb (ŝ) − (1 + z)γvb .

(A.42)
(A.43)

Then

1
(A.44)
pb − pa = (ϕb − ϕa ) γσd2 (1 + z) > 0
2
and thus Pŝ = [pa , pb ]. We need to verify that for all p∗ ∈ Pŝ we have that
θ(p∗ ) = 1. If s = ŝ then θ̂ = 1 + z > 0 and thus it follows from Theorem 1
that θ(p) = θ̂ − z = 1 if and only if p1 ≤ p ≤ p2 with
p1 = µa (ŝ) − (1 + z)γva
p2 = µb (ŝ) − (1 + z)γvb .

(A.45)
(A.46)

p1 = pa and p2 = pb and hence Pŝ is the set of equilibrium prices.
(i)(b) We need to verify that p∗ (s) = µb (s) − (1 + z)γvb leads to θ(p∗ (s)) = 1 for
all s < ŝ. If s < ŝ then θ̂ > 1 + z > 0 and thus it follows from Theorem 1
that
µb (s) − p∗ (s)
θ(p∗ (s)) =
−z =1
(A.47)
γvb
if and only if
( )
( )
p2 = µb (s)−max θ̂, 0 γvb < p∗ (s) < µb (s) −min θ̂, 0 γvb = p3 . (A.48)
Equation (A.48) is always satisﬁed because θ̂ > 1 + z > 0.
(i)(c) We need to verify that p∗ (s) = µa (s) − (1 + z)γva leads to θ(p∗ (s)) = 1 for
all s > ŝ. If s > ŝ then θ̂ < 1 + z and thus it follows from Theorem 1 that
θ(p∗ (s)) =

µa (s) − p∗ (s)
−z =1
γva

(A.49)

if and only if

or

( )
p∗ (s) = µa (s) − (1 + z)γva < p1 = µa (s) − max θ̂, 0 γva

(A.50)

( )
p∗ (s) = µa (s) − (1 + z)γva > p4 = µa (s) − min θ̂, 0 γva .

(A.51)

Equation (A.50) is always satisﬁed because (1 + z) > max(θ̂, 0).
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(ii) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in case (i) that

 {µa (s) − (1 + z)γva } if s < ŝ
Pŝ
if s = ŝ
p(s) ∈
(A.52)

{µb (s) − (1 + z)γvb } if s > ŝ
in which Pŝ = [pb , pa ] with

and

pb = µb (ŝ) − (1 + z)γvb
pa = µa (ŝ) − (1 + z)γva

(A.53)
(A.54)

1
pa − pb = −(ϕb − ϕa ) γσd2 (1 + z) > 0.
2

(A.55)

¯ (b) s < d,
¯ and (c) s > d.
¯
(iii) Consider the three subcases (a) s = d,
(iii)(a) Then it follows from Proposition 1 that CE(θ) = CES (θ, ϕa ) for all θ ∈ R.
From Proposition 4 follows that p(s) = d¯ is the unique equilibrium price.
(iii)(b) Let pa = µa (s) and pb = µb (s) then
¯ <0
pb − pa = (ϕb − ϕa )(s − d)

(A.56)

and thus P0 (s) = [pb , pa ]. We need to verify that for all p∗ ∈ P0 (s) we
have that θ(p∗ ) = 1. If s < d¯ then θ̂ > 0. From Theorem 1 follows that
θ(p) = −z = 1 if and only if
p3 = µb (s) ≤ p ≤ p4 = µa (s).

(A.57)

p3 = pb and p4 = pa and hence P0 (s) is the set of equilibrium prices.
(iii)(c) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in case (iii)(b)
that θ(p) = −z = 1 if and only if
p1 = µa (s) ≤ p ≤ p2 = µb (s)

(A.58)

and hence P0 (s) = [p1 , p2 ] is the set of equilibrium prices.

Proof of Proposition 5. The right and left limit of the price
equation (18) are

¯ − (1 − ϕa )βλ}
 {d¯ + ϕa (ŝ − d)
P0 (ŝ)
p+ (ŝ) = lim p(s) ∈
s↓ŝ
 ¯
¯ − (1 − ϕb )βλ}
{d + ϕb (ŝ − d)
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correspondence given in
if β > 0
if β = 0
if β < 0

(A.59)

and


¯ − (1 − ϕb )βλ} if β > 0
 {d¯ + ϕb (ŝ − d)
−
P0 (ŝ)
if β = 0
p (ŝ) ≡ lim p(s) ∈
s↑ŝ
 ¯
¯
{d + ϕa (ŝ − d) − (1 − ϕa )βλ} if β < 0,

(A.60)

respectively. It follows that
1
∆p(ŝ) = p+ (ŝ) − p− (ŝ) = − (ϕb − ϕa ) βλ < 0
2

if β > 0

(A.61)

and

1
∆p(ŝ) = p+ (ŝ) − p− (ŝ) = (ϕb − ϕa ) βλ < 0
if β < 0.
(A.62)
2
The set of left price limits is identical to the set of right price limits if β = 0 and thus
∆p(ŝ) = p+ (ŝ) − p− (ŝ) = 0.

(A.63)

1
∆p(ŝ) = − (ϕb − ϕa ) (max (β, 0) − min (β, 0)) λ.
2

(A.64)

It follows that

Note that there is no discontinuity if investors are risk neutral (γ = 0) because in
this case λ = 0. There is no discontinuity if investors are standard expected utility
maximizers because in this case ϕa = ϕb . Moreover, the price correspondence is upper
hemicontinuous for all βλ ∈ R and s ∈ R but it is not lower hemicontinuous (and
¯
thus not continuous) for all βλ ̸= 0 and s ̸= d.
c =
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Stock Price). Let γ > 0 and Var [w̃] > 0. Deﬁne βλ
¯
2(d − s) and
¯ − (1 − ϕa )βλ
pa (βλ) = d¯ + ϕa (s − d)
¯ − (1 − ϕb )βλ.
pb (βλ) = d¯ + ϕb (s − d)

(A.65)
(A.66)

¯
¯
c
Moreover, p ∈ Pβλ
c , if ∃ ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] such that p = d + ϕ(s − d) − (1 − ϕ)βλ and p ∈ P0 ,
¯
if ∃ ϕ ∈ [ϕa , ϕb ] such that p = d¯ + ϕ(s − d).
¯
Then there is a unique equilibrium stock price correspondence. Speciﬁcally, if s < d,
then

c

 {pa (βλ)} if βλ > βλ



c
if βλ = βλ
 Pβλ
c
p(βλ) ∈
(A.67)
c
{pb (βλ)} if 0 < βλ < βλ



P
if βλ = 0


 0
{pa (βλ)} if βλ < 0.
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¯ then
If s > d,


{pa (βλ)}




 Pβλ
c
p(βλ) ∈
{pb (βλ)}



P


 0
{pa (βλ)}

if
if
if
if
if

c
βλ < βλ
c
βλ = βλ
c < βλ < 0
βλ
βλ = 0
βλ > 0.

(A.68)

¯ then
and if s = d,
p(βλ) = pa (βλ).

(A.69)

I provide a proof of this Lemma in Section III of the internet appendix.
Proof of Proposition 6. The equilibrium price mapping p(βλ) given in equation (A.67)
c
and (A.68) has the two discontinuities βλ = 0 and βλ = βλ.
It follows from equation (A.67), (A.68), and (A.69) that the right and left limit of
c are
the price mapping p(βλ) when βλ = βλ
{
( )
pa (βλ) if s ≤ d¯
+ c
p βλ = lim p(βλ) =
(A.70)
pb (βλ) if s > d¯
c
βλ↓βλ
and
p

−

(

{
)
pa (βλ) if s ≥ d¯
c
βλ ≡ lim p(s) =
¯
pb (βλ) if s < d,
c
βλ↑βλ

(A.71)

respectively. Hence,
(

)

c =p
∆p βλ

+

(

)

c −p
βλ

−

(

)

c =
βλ

{

)
(
− (ϕb − ϕa() d¯ −)s ≤ 0 if s ≤ d¯
¯
(ϕb − ϕa ) d¯ − s ≤ 0
if s ≥ d.

(A.72)

which veriﬁes equation (20). It is straightforward to verify the size of the discontinuity given in equation (21) using similar arguments. Moreover, note that the price
correspondence p(βλ) is upper hemicontinuous for all s ∈ R but it is not lower hemi¯ If s = d¯ then p(βλ) is a continuous
continuous (and thus not continuous) for all s ̸= d.
function of βλ.
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Notes

1

Hence, this paper may shed some light on the fact that in the recent crisis investors

didn’t trade as much as one would expected in response to very bad news. “It is kind
of striking,” Mr. Utkus (from Vanguard) says. ”We had the most drastic market
decline since the Depression, we nearly had a total collapse of the global ﬁnancial
system, and all that caused most people not to do much at all.” in Zweig (2009)
2

Shiller (1992) writes in the introduction: “Prices change in substantial measure

because the investing public en masse capriciously changes its mind”.
3

Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider an example in which the signal can take

on two values and solve it numerically when investors are risk averse.
4

The issue of observational equivalence is often raised in the literature (see Backus,

Routledge, and Zin (September 2004)).
5

Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider a simple experiment that describes how

ambiguous information can lead to ambiguity about the posterior distribution even
though the prior distribution is known. The analysis could be generalized to allow
for an ambiguous prior without changing the main results of the paper. I show this
in the internet appendix of this article which is available online in the Supplements
and Datasets section at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
6

Another updating rule that considers this rule as special cases is proposed in

Epstein and Schneider (2007). See also Epstein and Schneider (2003) for updating
43

Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences in dynamic models.
7

The objective function is assumed to be continuous and the feasible set is compact

and hence I can replace the inﬁmum by the minimum.
8

The posterior mean and residual variance of future wealth are given in equation

(A.1) and (A.2) of the appendix.
9

Easley and O’Hara (2009) consider investors with CARA utility who are ambigu-

ous about the posterior mean and the variance of the asset. In their paper, investors
always choose the highest possible variance and hence portfolio inertia only occurs at
certainty.
10

¯ then there is
If the signal conﬁrms the expected value of the dividend (s = d),

no ambiguity about the conditional mean and hence the signal is always treated as
unreliable.
11

If ambiguity averse investors take on a short position in the asset, then they

behave like Savage investor with belief ϕa because in this case the worst case scenario
for the posterior asset mean and residual asset variances is an unreliable signal.
12

If the signal conveys good news, then the risky portfolio that hedges against

ambiguity is a short position in the asset.
13

I assume that there is uncertainty about aggregate wealth; i.e. Var [w̃] > 0.

14

The equilibrium stock price also satisﬁes equation (18) if the representative in-

vestors is risk neutral (γ = 0 and thus λ = 0). The proof is provided in Section II of
44

the internet appendix.
15

This behavior is empirically supported by Williams (2009) who shows that in-

vestors respond more to bad than to good earnings announcements following an increase in ambiguity.
16

A signal value lower than ŝ leads to more ambiguity about the posterior mean

because it constitutes a larger news surprise. Hence, the portfolio θ̂ which hedges
ambiguity is riskier for a signal value below ŝ than above ŝ.
17

The result is robust to other choices of ϕ.

18

The equilibrium stock price when there is no ambiguity about future labor income

and investors are risk neutral and averse to ambiguity simpliﬁes to (see Epstein and
Schneider (2008))
[
p(s) = min Eϕ
ϕ∈[ϕa ,ϕb ]

19

]
˜
¯ 0) + ϕb min(s − d,
¯ 0).
d | s̃ = s = d¯ + ϕa max(s − d,

With slight abuse of notation I denote this mapping also with p(·) and I report

it in Lemma 2 of the appendix.
20

I provide formal proofs of results (i) and (ii) in Section IV of the internet appendix.

21

The range of prices at which demand changes its slope does not depend on an

investor’s risk aversion and thus all demands can be added up as in the standard
expected utility case.
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22

There is also no price discontinuity if investors engage in betting or speculative

trade because then they don’t have a belief in common (see Billot, Chateauneuf,
Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) or Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008)).
23

I show in this section that there is no portfolio inertia and excess volatility by

means of a simple example and refer the interested reader to Section V of the internet
appendix for a rigorous proof.
24

Inequality (A.23) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ [θ̂, θ̂ + ϵ) if the right derivative of CE(x)

evaluated at x = θ̂ is less or equal than zero.
25

Inequality (A.24) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ (θ̂ − ϵ, θ̂] if the left derivative of CE(x)

evaluated at x = θ̂ is greater equal than zero.
26

Inequality (A.32) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ [0, ϵ) if the right derivative of CE(x)

evaluated at x = 0 is less or equal than zero.
27

Inequality (A.33) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ (−ϵ, 0] if the left derivative of CE(x) at

x = 0 is greater equal than zero.
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Bad News and Positive Correlation
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Figure 1: Optimal Demand
Both graphs show optimal demand when the signal conveys bad news (s = 75 <
d¯ = 100). The correlation between the stock and labor income is zero (z = 0) in
the left graph and positive (z = 0.4) in the right graph. In both graphs demand is
plotted as a function of the stock price for a Savage investor with belief ϕb (chain
dotted line), for a Savage investor with belief ϕa (dashed line), and for an ambiguity
averse investor with range of beliefs [ϕa , ϕb ] (solid line). There is a range of prices
for which an ambiguity averse investor is neither long nor short the stock, does not
change her long stock position, or does not change her short stock position. For all
other prices her demand is equal to the demand of Savage investor with belief ϕa or
ϕb . The parameters are σd = 5, γ = 2, ϕa = 1/5, and ϕb = 4/5.
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Good News
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Figure 2: Portfolio Inertia
The left graph shows optimal demand of an ambiguity averse investor when news is
bad and the right graph shows it when news is good. Demand is plotted as a function
of the price for conﬁrming news (solid line), a moderate news surprise (chain-dotted
line), and for a big news surprise (dashed line). Both graphs show that when news
is very surprising, then portfolio inertia is more severe and the portfolio at which
investors exhibit inertia is more risky. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, βa = 1/5,
βb = 4/5, z = 0, and γ = 2.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Stock Price
The left graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map of the stock. Investors treat
the signal as reliable if s < ŝ = 75 and as unreliable if s > ŝ. If the signal increases
through ŝ then the risk premium suddenly increases and thus the stock price drops.
The right graph shows supply and demand as a function of the stock price for three
diﬀerent signal realizations. Supply is price inelastic and equal to demand for an
interval of prices at ŝ. A slightly diﬀerent signal realizations shifts the inaction region
and thus leads to drastic changes in the market clearing stock price. The parameters
are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, ϕa = 1/5, ϕb = 4/5, γ = 2, and βλ = γσd2 = 50.
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Figure 4: Shocks to Cash Flow News
The left graph shows the stock price variance conditional on the signal being in an
ϵ−intervall around the critical signal value ŝ. Small news shocks lead to a large
variance when investors are averse to risk and ambiguity. The right graph shows
the equilibrium signal-to-price map of the stock. The stock price has a discontinuity
unless investors are neutral to ambiguity (solid line) or risk neutral (dashed line).
The parameters are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, ϕa = 1/5, ϕb = 4/5, and λβ = γσd2 .
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Negative Beta Stocks
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Figure 5: Positive and Negative Beta Stocks
Both graphs show the equilibrium signal-to-price map for diﬀerent asset betas. There
is a price discontinuity for bad news if the stock beta is positive and for good news if it
is negative. The sudden price drops are more severe for risky stocks. The parameters
are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, γ = 1, ϕa = 1/10, and ϕb = 9/10.
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Figure 6: Shocks to Stock Risk Premia
Both graphs show the equilibrium risk-premium-to-price map. The signal conveys
bad news in the left graph and good news in the right graph. Small changes to the
stock risk premium may result in drastic changes in the stock price. The price drop
is more severe for big news surprises. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, γ = 1,
ϕa = 1/10, and ϕb = 9/10.
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Figure 7: Aggregation
The left graph shows demand of three diﬀerent investors and aggregate demand when
¯ 1 γσ 2 = 93.75 with risk aversion equal to γ = 1/2. Investors diﬀer with respect
ŝ = d−
d
2
to their aversion to risk and ambiguity: (θ1 ) γ1 = 5 and [ϕa1 , ϕb1 ] = [1/10, 9/10], (θ2 )
γ2 = 5/4 and [ϕa2 , ϕb2 ] = [1/4, 3/4], and (θ3 ) γ3 = 1 and [ϕa3 , ϕb3 ] = [1/4, 4/5].
Individual demands add up to one for a range of prices at which the second investor
does not change her demand and thus there is an interval of equilibrium stock prices.
The right graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map for an economy that is
populated by∑
the three investors (solid line) and ∩
for a representative agent economy
3
3
with 1/γ =
h=1 (1/γh ) = 1/2 and [ϕa , ϕb ] =
h=1 [ϕah , ϕbh ] = [1/4, 3/4] (dashed
line). The parameters are d¯ = 100 and σd = 5.

51

86

[φa, φb]
φm

84

Equilibrium Stock Price

Equilibrium Demand

0.6

0.55

0.5

0.45

82

80

78

76
(φm, φa)

0.4

74

(φ , φ )
m

b

(φ , [φ , φ ])
0.35

75

80

85

90

72

95

m

75

80

85

90

a

b

95

Signal

Signal

Figure 8: Ambiguity Averse and Savage Investors
The right graph shows the equilibrium price as a function of the signal when the
economy consists of two Savage investors with beliefs ϕm = (ϕa +ϕb )/2 and ϕb (dashed
line), two Savage investors with beliefs ϕm and ϕa (chain-dotted line), and one Savage
investor with belief ϕm and one ambiguity averse investor with range of beliefs [ϕa , ϕb ]
(solid line). The left graph shows optimal demand of the ambiguity averse investor
(solid line) and the equilibrium demand of the Savage investor with belief ϕm (dashed
line). There is a range of signal values for which (i) both investors are in the market
and the ambiguity averse investor behaves like a Savage investor, (ii) both investors
are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor does not behave like a Savage
investor, (iii) the ambiguity averse investor does not participate (part (iii) is not
apparent from the graphs but occurs for very good or bad news).
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One Standard Deviation Bad News Suprise

Two Standard Deviation Bad News Surprise
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Figure 9: No Portfolio Inertia with Savage Investors
Both graphs show optimal demand of an ambiguity averse investor with a range of
signal precisions [ϕa , ϕb ] (solid line), and investors with standard expected utility
who have a unique prior over this range (dotted line), who have the dogmatic belief
ϕa (dashed line), and who have the dogmatic belief ϕb (chain-dotted line). The
left ﬁgure shows demand when the signal represents a one standard deviation news
surprise (πs = 75.47%) and the right ﬁgure shows it for a two standard deviation news
surprise (πs = 99.96%). Demands of standard expected utility maximizers are strictly
decreasing in the stock price and thus there is no portfolio inertia. The parameters
are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, γ = 1, ϕa = 1/10, and ϕb = 9/10.
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Figure 10: No Excess Volatility with Savage Investors
The left graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when γ = 0.5 and the right
graph shows it when γ = 1. In all graphs the price is plotted for an ambiguity averse
representative investor who has a range of signal precisions [ϕa , ϕb ] (solid line), and
for a representative investor with standard expected utility who has a unique prior
over this range (dotted line), who has the dogmatic belief ϕa (dashed line), and who
has the dogmatic belief ϕb (chain-dotted line). The stock price is a smooth function
of the signal and thus there is no excess volatility when the representative investor
maximizes standard expected utility. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σd = 5, ϕa = 1/10,
and ϕb = 9/10.
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